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Introduction
Public, four-year universities employ a vast number of people in various
occupations. Universities have diversified interests and goals encompassing areas such
as research and community service, but the general assumption is that teaching provides
public schools with the necessary financial autonomy to carry out their mission.
Assuming that teaching students is the primary purpose of a university, one might think
of professors and instructors as the primary positions; however, while they serve a critical
function, their service to the student body would not be possible without the presence of
the various support positions throughout the campus. Universities require a wide array of
employees, job titles, and classifications to support a national higher education industry
that as of 2001 generated more than $124 billion annually (Lowenstein, 2001).
Glancing at the human resources’ webpage of a typical, mid-sized state university
such as Southern Illinois University Carbondale (SIUC) reveals job titles such as
accountant, brick mason, cook, electrician, ironworker, nurse, office manager, painter,
pipefitter, plumber, refrigeration mechanic, and sheet metal worker (SIUC, 2010a).
Additionally, the university employs attorneys, physicians, engineers, police officers,
custodians, groundskeepers, along with various other support staff and administrative
personnel, yet all of these various positions fall under one of three categories: faculty,
civil service, and administrative/ professional (SIUC, 2010a). In just a decade, the total
number of employees at SIUC increased nearly 11% starting with 5,035 employees in
2000 and ending with 5,584 employees in 2009 (SIUC, 2010b).
These positions fulfill various needs of the university, but these needs originate
with the students. State universities receive public funding to fulfill their mission of
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education in addition to tuition and fees paid by the students, which at SIUC equated to
$10,411 for the 2009-2010 academic year (SIUC, 2010b). Based on the assumption that
the primary reason students attend universities is to receive their education, then state
universities should remain cognizant of their public accountability to provide this service.
Nonetheless, universities require various support staff in addition to professors in order to
achieve their mission.
With so many varied job titles, managing personnel at a public university could
arguably be one of the most challenging areas of public human resource management
(HRM). Some institutions such as the University of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV) have
taken a collaborative approach to university HRM by partnering human resources with
academic resource units to serve the needs of the institution, but the UNLV partnership
tends to stand as an exception and not the rule in public university human resources
(Connally & Neuman, 2006). While a similar collaborative partnership does not exist at
SIUC, the Human Resources Department does act as a liaison between the employees and
various state agencies impacting salary, retirement, and benefits (SIUC, 2010a).
While some in the field of human resources use phrases such as merit system and
civil service synonymously (Berman, Bowman, West, & Van Wart, 2010), they refer to
two different groups of employees in public universities. The two largest human resource
constituencies at SIUC in terms of number of employees consist of the faculty and the
civil service, with the largest percentage of the university’s employees belonging to the
civil service (SIUC, 2010b). Civil service employees compete for their positions through
a process of competitive examinations to obtain positions free from the influences
political patronage with an increased level of job security (Berman et al., 2010). The

3
origins of the modern civil service system stem from passage of the Pendleton Act which
created the Civil Service Commission in 1883 following the assassination of President
Garfield by a disgruntled job seeker (Nigro, 2006).
However, at the state level, civil service practices differ greatly as has been well
documented in the literature with the cases of Florida, Georgia, and Texas (Kellough &
Nigro, 2002; McEntee, 2006; Condrey & Battaglio, 2007). Georgia, being the most
extreme example of the three states, has eliminated its civil service system, moving
instead to at-will employment for new hires starting in 1996 through its GeorgiaGain
program (Kellough & Nigro, 2002; McEntee, 2006). Likewise, this differentiation of
civil service practices and reforms extends to the university systems. In the State of
Wisconsin, the Division of Merit Recruitment and Selection (DMRS) oversees the human
resource functions for the civil service positions in 40 state agencies and the 26 campuses
in the University of Wisconsin system (Lavigna, 1996). In Japan, the university system
reform measures mirror those implemented in GeorgiaGain, removing employees from
the civil service system and ending guaranteed employment to the extent that even the
faculty must compete for research funding (Cyranoski & Chou, 2004). The State of
Illinois takes a slightly more decentralized approach to the civil service practices within
its public universities (Pynes, Harrick, & Schaefer, 1997).
The Illinois General Assembly created the State Universities Civil Service System
(SUCSS) as a separate government entity in 1952 “to develop, maintain, and administer a
comprehensive and efficient program of human resource administration for the higher
education community” (SUCSS, 2010, p. 3). The SUCSS maintains autonomy from
other state agencies so as to create civil service policy specific to the needs of higher
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education, yet the University System serves a combined 20 universities and other
nonacademic institutions that each maintains its own human resources department, which
can result in the execution of the same policy differently throughout the State of Illinois
(Pynes et al, 1997).
Merit evaluations in the State University Civil Service System rely upon
standardized performance evaluations, which are common across merit systems (Berman
et al., 2010; SUCSS, 2010), yet faculty merit pay evaluations differ across universities
(Cyranoski & Chou, 2004). With such great attention to the merit and civil service
systems at both the state and university levels, less research exists on faculty merit
compensation systems. In fact, Terpstra and Honoree (2009, p. 55) found that “little
empirical data exists regarding the effectiveness and the nature of merit pay plans in
higher education.” As such, this study explores the following research question: What
are the components of faculty merit systems at four-year universities?
Methodology
The methodology for this research study involves a combination of hermeneutics
and content analysis, given the lack of empirical data. A hermeneutic approach allows
for an interpretation of existing literature, while content analysis provides a researcher
with a quantitative component of existing texts (McNabb, 2008). The analysis focuses on
existing research studies on merit compensation systems. This framework allows the
research to overcome the lack of empirical data. Furthermore, the methodology provides
a system of establishing a conceptual framework of merit compensation systems in
faculty members at four-year universities. An additional advantage of utilizing this
framework stems from the need to focus the research towards merit compensation
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systems in universities, in particular focusing the inquiry to obtain relevant variables
unique to four-year universities.
Bernard acknowledged the susceptibility of this approach to researcher bias as a
limitation (as cited in McNabb, 2008). The greatest limitation of this approach comes
from the inability to generalize the findings of the study. However, the purpose of this
content analysis is not to obtain generalizability of merit systems, but to provide an
overview of existing information. Hence, the goal of the project is to provide a
descriptive study on merit systems in four-year public universities.
In order to achieve this descriptive study, this paper aims to analyze the existing
literature. Foremost, the research establishes the multiple uses of merit within four-year
public universities. Upon establishing the dual merit systems within universities, the
research examines the structure of merit compensation systems as they relate to
university faculty. Regardless of the specifics of merit structures, pay-for-performance
systems require certain conditions for success. The paper highlights these conditions
presented in the existing literature as well as the psychological motivations of employees
in such systems. Upon establishing the conditions for success and the motivations, the
research examines the barriers to success of merit systems. Finally, the paper explores
the link in the literature between the performance and pay, the faculty appraisal. The
analysis of the existing literature thus establishes the framework to examine specific
studies of merit systems and how they manifest themselves in actual universities.
Merit Pay in Higher Education
In a merit pay system or pay-for-performance system, a manager bases an
employee’s annual income adjustment upon the individual employee’s performance
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during the previous year (Kellough, 2006). The premise behind the merit based pay
system presumes the prospect of increased pay will lead employees to put forth an
increased effort (Kellough & Nigro, 2002). While this premise can appeal to both
administrators and employees, the benefits of a merit compensation system differ
between the two groups.
From an administrative standpoint, research reveals numerous operational
advantages to implementing a merit compensation system (Sutton & Bergerson, 2001).
Merit systems provide faculty with incentives to improve their productivity and to strive
for excellence within their profession. Administrators view merit compensation as a
means of raising the average salary in the university, which aids in attracting and
recruiting new faculty members. Additionally, merit systems provide university
administration with both more managerial discretion as well as an additional avenue of
communication with faculty members.
Beyond these operational incentives for administrators, Hanley and Forkebrock
(2006) identify merit compensation systems as a means of fostering competition to bring
in additional funding to public university in times of decreasing assistance from the state.
The relationship between state governments and public universities is a symbiotic
association where institutions provide “an educated citizenry,” while the state
government “bear[s] the primary responsibility of funding postsecondary education”
(Weerts & Ronca, 2006, p. 935). However, state appropriations for high education
compared to overall spending decreased from 7.3% in 1977 to 5.3% in 2000 (Hanley &
Forkenbrock, 2006). While the decrease only accounts for two percent of a state budget,
public universities have experienced a 40% decrease in state funding from 1978 to 2006,
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forcing universities to rely more heavily upon grants, donations, endowments, and
student enrollment for income (Weerts & Ronca, 2006). From 1991 through 2003, state
appropriations per full-time equivalent student decreased 7.3 percent (Hanley &
Forkenbrock, 2006).
According to data obtained from the SIUC Budget Office’s website, state
appropriations accounted for 39.33% of the University’s total funding in fiscal year 1998,
yet that revenue source declined to only 28.01% of total funding by fiscal year 2010.
During the same time frame, on-campus student tuition, including only tuition income
from students registered for courses taught at SIUC’s Carbondale campus and not
including tuition from distance education or classes offered at off-campus locations,
increased from 16.08% to 22.20% of total funding (SIUC Budget Office, 2010). These
decreases in state funding are undoubtedly partially responsible for Wilson’s findings that
nationwide, faculty only received a 2.1% increase in salary from 2003 to 2004, the lowest
annual faculty salary increase in 30 years (as cited in Hanley & Forkenbrock, 2006).
Thus, university administrators have placed an elevated emphasis on the enterprising
nature of research, rewarding faculty members with merit increases when they bring in
contracts and grants that can replace state appropriated funding (Hanley & Forkenbrock,
2006).
In a paper presented to the Faculty Senate of Chaminade University of Honolulu,
Fassiotto (1986) presented three, concise arguments in favor of merit from the faculty
perspective. First, merit systems can reward faculty members for excellence in their
profession such as poets laureate or Nobel Prize recipients. Second, a merit system can
act as an incentive to faculty members. Third, merit compensation systems act as a
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method of increasing salaries, and universities utilizing merit have higher average faculty
salaries. While Fassiotto’s arguments appear logical, they depend upon the structure of
the merit system.
Structure of Merit systems
While both administrators and faculty find possible benefits from merit
compensation systems, the success of the system depends upon the structure. A
successful compensation system must benefit the faculty by enhancing personnel and
professional development while simultaneously benefiting the institution by allowing for
institutional and organizational development (Schaffner & MacKinnon, 2002). While the
original faculty merit compensation system, developed during the Renaissance, no longer
exists in modern public universities, similar systems exist where universities compensate
athletic directors and coaches entirely based upon merit (Fassiotto, 1986). Modern merit
compensation systems often combine meritorious increases along with a standard cost of
living adjustment (COLA); however, Fassiotto (1986) cautions that a large merit
percentage increase can create unrest amongst other faculty members only receiving the
COLA, yet a small meritorious percentage increase does not create incentive to put forth
additional effort. The COLA and merit increases involve step increases such that an
employee’s base salary increases, but a compensation system can also reward meritorious
employees with a fixed dollar amount increase or one-time bonus (Hanley &
Forkenbrock, 2006). Fassiotto (1986, p. 5) compares this one-time bonus to the
“Christmas bonus” system sometimes found in the private sector. An additional area of
unrest can exist for lecturers and non-tenure track faculty who are not subject to the
publishing requirements of tenure track professors, but still undergo the same merit
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evaluation (Schulz & Tanguay, 2006). Regardless of these structural issues, merit
compensation systems have the potential to achieve success when they present certain
conditions.
Conditions for Success
Regardless of which type of merit system a university uses, the literature reveals
eight key conditions that must exist in order for it to achieve a measure of success:
(Griffith & Neugarten, 1984; Sutton & Bergerson, 2001; Hanley & Forkenbrock, 2006).
1. Knowledge of goals
2. A link between performance and reward
3. Personal responsibility for achieving goals
4. A measure of influence or control over the criteria
5. A significant difference between merit pay and base pay
6. Worker protection from outside factors.
7. A belief that the system is fair
8. Minimization of negative consequences
Foremost, administrators must clearly define the institution’s mission, vision, and goals
to employees, and they must ensure that the employees know the goals of both the
university and the department (Hanley & Forkenbrock, 2006). If the mission statement
and compensation system do not coincide, the university should consider revising or
completely rewriting the mission statement to express realistic goals (Diamond, 1993;
Sutton & Bergerson, 2001).
Once faculty members are aware of the university’s goals, they must believe that
high performance or achieving the goals at a high level directly results in higher levels of
pay (Griffith & Neugarten, 1984; Sutton & Bergerson, 2001). Additionally, each
individual employee must accept some level of responsibility of achieving the goals and
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the organizational mission (Hanley & Forkenbrock, 2006). While faculty members may
not hold influence over a university’s goals or mission statement, they must enjoy some
level of control over the criteria used in the evaluation process (Sutton & Bergerson,
2001). However, this raises issues of faculty rights versus administrative discretion in the
evaluation process that need addressing at each institution (Griffith & Neugarten, 1984).
Central to the success of pay-for-performance systems, high performing faculty
members must earn compensation significantly beyond the base pay (Sutton &
Bergerson, 2001). This tenet also assumes administrators will reward high achievers with
relatively similar amounts of compensation (Griffith & Neugarten, 1984). The corollary
to this tenet presumes that while exceptional faculty receive appropriate rewards,
employees maintaining satisfactory performance must continue to receive standard
adjustments to their salary (Hanley & Forkenbrock, 2006).
Another key condition to the success of merit compensation systems, the system
should shelter individual workers from factors beyond their control, which is often
problematic for public universities dependent upon funding from state appropriations
(Griffith & Neugarten, 1984; Sutton & Bergerson, 2001). Likewise, all faculty members
must believe that the system is fair and without bias, regardless of the outcome of their
personal evaluations (Hanley & Forkenbrock, 2006).
Finally, a successful compensation system needs to contain a mechanism to
minimize negative consequences of earning higher pay such as resentment from peers
(Griffith & Neugarten, 1984; Sutton & Bergerson, 2001). While pay-for-performance
systems depend upon these conditions set forth by the institution, their success also
requires proper employee motivation.
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Motivation
The success of a merit system hinges upon the successful motivation of
employees. Schulz and Tanguay (2006) divide the psychological motivations between
expectancy theory and equity theory while dividing the economic motivations between
agency theory, implicit contract theory, and efficiency wage theory.
Expectancy theory stipulates that the visible linkage between performance and
pay incentives determines the success of a merit system such that employees must
identify rewards in advance in order to receive motivation from the expected reward
(Kellough, 2006; Schulz & Tanguay, 2006). Equity theory centers on the earned merit
pay matching the employee’s effort (Schulz & Tanguay, 2006).
Agency theory acts as a measure of strategic human resource management,
aligning the employees’ monetary rewards with the overall organizational objectives
(Becker & Huselid, 2006; Schulz & Tanguay, 2006). Likewise, implicit contract theory
states that pay varies between employees just as job performance varies, which equates to
a differentiated investment in employees based upon both their strategic value and their
performance (Becker & Huselid, 2006; Kellough, 2006). Finally, efficiency wage theory
proclaims that higher wages encourage employees to achieve maximum performance
(Schulz & Tanguay, 2006).
Merit systems initially appear attractive to employees based on psychological and
economic theories that appeal to employee’s “conventional wisdom” (Berman et al.,
2010, p. 214). However, in relying upon these theories, faculty merit compensation
systems may fail to take into account the motivational needs of their intended recipients.
In implementing pay-for-performance systems in higher education, university
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administrators erroneously assume faculty members hold monetary compensation as their
highest motivating determinant (Fassiotto, 1986). Ramirez (2001) examines research that
identifies over 3,000 factors that either increase or diminish employee motivation. He
concludes that factors such as recognition, achievement, responsibility, as well as career
and professional development rank higher in motivating employees to achieve higher
levels of performance than monetary compensation.
The motivational theories presented by Becker and Huselid (2006), Kellough
(2006), and Schulz and Tanguay (2006) contradict the assumptions presented by Ramirez
(2001) and Fassiotto (1986). Faculty members have already distinguished themselves
educationally, yet merit pay systems make assumptions based on antiquated management
philosophies that only a few will put forth professional effort worthy of meritorious
recognition (Fassiotto, 1986). In organizational theory, concepts of the merit
compensation system originated with Frederick Taylor’s development of scientific
management theory where he penalized workers who underperformed while paying
bonuses to those who exceeded expectations (Tompkins, 2005).
Ramirez (2001) examines merit systems in relation to Abraham Maslow’s
hierarchy of needs. This examination results in the belief that systems, which solely
focus on lower-level needs such as compensation and benefits, may drive educators out
of their profession. Hanley and Forkenbrock (2006, p. 111) acknowledge that “most
faculty of public research universities did not choose their vocation on the basis of
anticipated remuneration.” Furthermore, few universities, especially public universities,
can afford to pay faculty members a salary equivalent to the marketable value of their
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skills (Fassiotto, 1986). Systems focusing on the lower level needs highlight one of the
first barriers to success of merit systems.

Barriers to Success
While proponents of merit pay systems in public universities expound upon the
potential of the practice to align faculty contributions with the research, teaching, and
service goals of the institution (Schulz & Tanguay, 2006), critics point to numerous
barriers to successful implementation. Foremost, the concept of merit pay evaluations
creates multiple non-industry-specific implementation difficulties. Berman et al. (2010,
p. 214) acknowledge that in order to have a successful merit pay system, preconditions
such as “trust in management, a valid job evaluation system, clear performance factors,
meaningful and consistent funding, and accurate personnel appraisal” must already exist
within the organization. The dependency upon the appraisal system alone offers
numerous possibilities for errors described by Kellough (2006) including the halo effect
where evaluators rate an employee who performs well in one dimension high in other
areas, the first-impression error where supervisors base subsequent evaluations on their
first impression of the employee, or the central tendency error where evaluators mark all
employees as average.
Furthermore, even when organizations meet the preconditions, merit pay systems
have the potential to erode teamwork and camaraderie by placing greater emphasis on
individual achievement (Berman et al., 2010). This emphasis on the individual may act
as a barrier working against expectancy theory as dependency upon teams breaks the
linkage between an employee’s individual performance and an expected monetary reward
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(Kellough, 2006). Moreover, pay-for-performance systems inadvertently forgo long-term
benefits while focusing on immediate returns, set limits on expectations, and direct
attention to more easily measured tasks regardless of their relevance to organizational
objectives (Berman et al., 2010; Kellough, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2002).
The greatest critique of pay-for-performance in public university faculty concerns
the weight placed upon research (Barclay & York, 2003; Schulz & Tanguay, 2006;
Terpstra & Honoree, 2009). Evaluators certainly take teaching performance and service
into consideration, yet they place a disproportionate amount of weight on research
(Schulz & Tanguay, 2006). This raises an issue of validity as to what the weight placed
upon research is actually measuring. Furthermore, the disproportionate emphasis placed
on research in current public university merit systems may work to the detriment of both
the faculty member under evaluation and the university. This system forces faculty to
concentrate on research at the expense of teaching and service, which carry different
weights in tenure evaluation than they do in merit pay appraisals, and if the faculty are
placing too much emphasis on research, then the university could experience fewer
numbers of enrolling students along with fewer donations from the community (Barclay
& York, 2003). The current practice reinforces the “publish or perish” doctrine while
devaluing the “teacher scholar” model (Schulz & Tanguay, 2006, p. 81). The researchteaching dichotomy surfaces again in faculty appraisal systems.
Faculty Appraisal
The common-sense logic behind the motivational theories results in an increasing
number of public universities implementing some version of a pay-for-performance
system (Schulz & Tanguay, 2006). However, the implementation of merit pay systems
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may not make sense in all sectors of public institutions. More specifically, universities
interested in these systems typically employ them with their faculty (Schulz & Tanguay,
2006; Terpstra & Honoree, 2009).
The success of merit pay systems in public universities or any other industry
depends greatly upon the ability of management to link performance to pay via the
appraisal and evaluation process (Kellough, 2006). A successful appraisal system should
contain specific criteria which provide both guidance to faculty on the expectations of the
administration and flexibility to the administration to evaluate total accomplishments of
individual faculty members (Schaffner & MacKinnon, 2002). However, in order for the
merit criteria to guide faculty members, they must be aware of the criteria. In fact,
Anderson (1992) recommends that the faculty have a voice in the design of the appraisal
system and in the selection of the criteria used in the evaluation. The absence of
information relating to performance criteria increases the tension level in a department,
compounding the natural anxiety associated with the evaluation process (Schaffner &
MacKinnon, 2002).
Nicklin points to a ruling against Kent State University on August 25, 2000 in
which a judge ruled in favor of a female faculty member partially due to the opaqueness
of the school’s merit system (as cited in Schaffner & MacKinnon, 2002). This ruling
validates Anderson’s argument for allowing faculty involvement in deciding upon
criteria. The amount of influence faculty members have in the creation of evaluation
criteria differs across institutions. When faculty members have influence in the criteria,
the spectrum of involvement ranges from mere consultation to total discretionary
authority over the criteria (Griffith & Neugarten, 1984).
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The Association for the Study of Higher Education (2001) points towards Towson
State University (now Towson University) as an example of a university successfully
implementing performance criteria in a merit system. A member of the University
System of Maryland, Towson is the second largest university in the state behind the
flagship school, University of Maryland at College Park. In 1990, the University System
of Maryland required each member institution to revise its mission statement. In the
process of revising its mission statement, Towson also redesigned its faculty
compensation system. The development of the new compensation system required seven
years to complete; however, the end result was a merit system with four critical elements.
First, Towson provided each faculty member with a guidebook describing the faculty’s
role and reward system. Second, the new merit system provided teaching incentives and
aid to faculty to develop their teaching ability. Third, the faculty governing body
developed the resulting system. Finally, each department under the new merit
compensation system has control over the criteria utilized to evaluate faculty members
within the unit.
In higher education, administrations generally base faculty appraisals upon three
criteria: teaching, research, and service (Schulz & Tanguay, 2006; Terpstra & Honoree,
2009). Additional accepted criteria include a professor’s administrative ability as well as
the number of contracts and grants he/she received over the course of the academic year
(Griffith & Neugarten, 1984). While the appraisal systems for merit reviews and for
tenure reviews use similar criteria, annual merit pay reviews differ greatly from the latter
in variability of the results and in the number of faculty evaluated at one time (Barclay &
York, 2003).
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Beyond the mere existence of criteria, the criteria must have identifiable and
measurable aspects, and the faculty must have adequate variation in their performance
criteria (Barclay & York, 2003; Kellough, 2006). The literature on merit pay in higher
education concurs unanimously that faculty evaluations place the greatest emphasis on
research; however, speculation remains on whether the evaluations grade research on
quantity or quality (Barclay & York, 2003; Schulz & Tanguay, 2006; Terpstra &
Honoree, 2009). Questions of quality and quantity aside, Hanley and Forkenbrock
(2006) acknowledge scholarship as the most easily measured criterion in terms of the
number of scholarly publications produced within a given time frame; however,
evaluators inherently face greater difficultly in objectively and reliably evaluating either
teaching or service.
The evaluations typically place the second greatest weight upon teaching, but
teaching measurement instruments vary between student evaluations, peer evaluations, or
a combination of the two (Schulz & Tanguay, 2006). Hanley and Forkenbrock (2006)
claim that evaluations often skew teaching performance measures toward measuring the
process of teaching rather than the desired outcomes. Teaching evaluations too often
look towards the inputs of education such as available office hours, contact hours with
students, or time taken returning graded assignments instead of student learning
(Fairweather, 2002). Ideally, merit compensation systems should analyze both inputs and
outcomes in evaluating teaching performance (Hanley & Forkenbrock, 2006). The
evaluation process typically places the least emphasis on service, largely due to the
debate over what constitutes service: participation at committee meetings versus
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contributions to the university or professional community (Schulz & Tanguay, 2006;
Terpstra & Honoree, 2009).
Moreover, merit pay systems differ in who conducts the evaluation process. A
survey conducted by Terpstra and Honoree (2009) found that department chairs conduct
slightly over half of all evaluations while peer committees conduct an additional 20% of
evaluations, with deans or higher-level administrators also conducting 20% of merit
based evaluations. While the source of the evaluation appraisal may intuitively seem
important, the aforementioned study found no significant difference in the outcome of the
appraisal based upon the source.
Case Studies
In the discussion of motivation, both the motivational theories presented by
Becker and Huselid (2006), Kellough (2006), and Schulz and Tanguay (2006) as well as
the assumptions on university faculty presented by Ramirez (2001) and Fassiotto (1986)
make logical arguments regarding motivation and merit compensation systems.
Determining the validity of either theoretical position requires examining exisiting merit
systems. As previously mentioned, the current literature lacks significant data on faculty
merit compensation systems, yet the existing studies illustrate both the structure and the
effectiveness of merit systems in practical settings. While the following studies provide
insight to current pay-for-performance systems and share some common characteristics,
they only provide a narrow view of the uses of merit pay in higher education. As such,
one should not accept these commonalities as generalizable results.
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University of California
In her study of the University of California, Ellen Switkes (1999) found the
institution’s merit review system similar to those of other universities. However, she
determined that the California system as more defined with reviews conducted on a more
frequent and regular basis. She examined the entire University of California (UC) system
consisting of nine campuses with five schools of medicine, three law schools, five
business schools, two dental schools, two Schools of Public Health, a School of
Pharmacy, Optometry, and Veterinary Medicine, and other graduate and professional
programs. At that time, the campus at Merced, which opened in 2005, was under
development. When Switkes (1999) published her study, the UC system enrolled over
165,000 students and employed more than 14,000 faculty members, of whom nearly
7,200 were eligible for the merit system. In the UC system, only tenure-track professors
receive merit evaluations, thus the approximate 6,800 lecturers and non-tenure-track
faculty were ineligible.
Collaboratively developed between the University President and faculty in the
1920s, the UC peer review system stands as one of the oldest in the country. The
University utilizes the system for merit, promotion, as well as tenure reviews. The UC
ranks academic personnel on a ladder system with 20 formal steps. Instructor is the
lowest ranking step and while employees in the position are eligible for meritorious
increases, they are not eligible for promotion increases. The next step on the ladder is
Assistant Professor I; there are six total Assistant Professor steps, followed by five
Associate Professor steps, and eight steps categorized as Professor. The UC peer review
system evaluates faculty at steps Assistant Professor I through Associate Professor III
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every two years and faculty at steps Associate Professor IV through Professor IV every
three years. Most academic personnel plateau at Professor V with steps Professor VI
through VIII reserved for the University’s most distinguished scholars. While a faculty
member can request deferment of the review process, no academic personnel can go more
than five years without a peer review. Abiding by this schedule, approximately one-third
of all faculty members come under review each year.
Each step on the ladder corresponds to a particular salary; however, the system
contains enough flexibility as to allow for off-scale increases. Departments use off-scale
salaries when hiring or promoting faculty under “special market conditions” such as
award recipients (Switkes, 1999, p. 41). The result is typically a 1.5 step increase. In
contrast, departments also assign off-scale increases to faculty members who did not
demonstrate enough meritorious performance to warrant a complete step increase, but
still deserve recognition due to smaller accomplishments.
The review process in the UC system initiates in the spring semester when the
University notifies the department. The following fall the faculty member assembles a
file containing all the accomplishments since the last review along with a letter outlining
the work and any pending work. A committee from the department initially reviews the
file before sending it to the department chair. The chair makes his/her recommendation
and forwards the file to the dean. Upon completion, the dean sends the file to the
campus’ Committee on Academic Personnel (CAP). The committee then makes the final
recommendation to the chancellor.
The UC peer review system evaluates faculty on the basis of teaching, research,
and service. However, the system determines the distribution of weight for each criterion
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based upon the professor’s workload. Therefore, the system does not penalize faculty
with greater administrative responsibility or faculty involved with critical campus
committees for lower teaching or research contributions.
This study presents a major limitation in the analysis of the effectiveness of merit
systems. Just as Hanley and Forkenbrock (2006) criticized teaching evaluations for their
focus on the process and not the outcome, Switkes (1999) focuses her work on the
structure and processes of the UC system. She does not consider the outcomes or outputs
from the perspective of the faculty or the administration.
Florida State University System
Kristine Anderson (1992) focused her study on faculty perceptions of the Florida
State University System (FSUS) merit evaluation program. While Anderson’s analysis
certainly provides valuable insight to faculty attitudes, one must first understand the
limitations of her data set that raise questions of the study’s internal and external validity.
Foremost, Anderson presented her findings at annual meeting of the Association for the
Study of Higher Education on November 1, 1992, but collected her data from a 1988
survey, thus the age of the study causes concern for its applicability over two decades
later. Furthermore, Anderson did not design the questionnaire, and the original survey
author sought to examine the faculty members’ attitudes toward bargaining priorities, not
the merit pay system. Additionally, the data collected did not fully represent the FSUS
faculty in 1988 nor would it be representative of the modern workforce. The FSUS
system consisted of nine campuses in 1988 as compared to the modern system containing
eleven institutions. Of the nine universities, Anderson (1992) based her study on eight as
one school hand-tabulated the survey results. While the FSUS employed 5,777 faculty
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members in 1988, the survey only resulted in 954 usable returns for a 16.5% response
rate. Based on her comparison of the survey results with the university system profile,
Anderson (1992) determined the following:
Underrepresentation occurs for those at the assistant professor and instructor
ranks, faculty in the sciences, math and engineering, and faculty at the older
research universities (UF, FSU). Union members, as one would expect, are
overrepresented in the sample, with about 45% of the sample claiming union
membership, vs. a population figure at the time of about 30% across the system.
(p. 13)
The relevance of Anderson’s work comes from its proximity to the enactment of
the Florida State University System’s merit system. The FSUS Board of Regents and the
union representing the faculty first agreed to the merit compensation system in 1984.
While the Board insisted upon discretionary merit raises, the union prevailed in the
negotiation. The resulting agreement allowed each department to draft its own merit
criteria specific to the needs of its faculty. Once the department drafted the criteria, the
faculty members voted to approve the drafted criteria and evaluation process, and the
department sent the results to the university administration for final approval.
Departmental control over the criteria selection resulted in great disparity as the merit
process in departments at any one institution and across the FSUS varied greatly “in
complexity as well as in criteria” (Anderson, 1992, p. 11).
In her analysis of the questionnaires, Anderson (1992) divided the FSUS
universities into three categories: research universities, large regional universities, and
small regional universities. Her results revealed that faculty at the research and large

23
regional universities were more aware of their department’s merit criteria, while nearly
20% of faculty members at the smaller regional universities believed that their
departments did not have merit criteria. Likewise, the faculty members at the small
regional universities were more likely to disagree or strongly disagree with the concept
that the university fairly distributed the merit funding.
Overall, the study found mixed attitudes towards the merit system. Only 69% of
respondents knew their department had established merit criteria even though the FSUS
system requires formalized procedures. Furthermore, 11% of faculty respondents were
certain that their departments did not have criteria and another 20% were unsure if merit
criteria existed for their departments. The library staff members were the most cognizant
of the merit criteria for their department, and 90% of faculty surveyed in the academic
areas of education, liberal arts, and behavioral sciences were aware of the criteria for their
respective departments. However, these academics were the least supportive of the merit
system.
In contrast, Anderson (1992) found that professors in the areas of business and the
sciences were the least aware of the existence of merit criteria, yet the most likely to
believe that the administration distributes merit raises fairly. Across all disciplines, full
and associate professors were more aware of their departments’ merit criteria than
assistant professors or instructors. Forty-seven percent of all respondents believed that
merit consideration should constitute a smaller proportion of the overall raise package,
and only 10% wished to shift away from across-the-board raises to merit increases.
Anderson (1992) concluded that the perception of merit criteria is critical in determining
faculty support as employees are more likely to support merit compensation systems
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when they are aware of the criteria, believe the criteria are used in the allocation of merit
rewards, and feel the administration provides equitable distribution of the merit awards.
An unnamed university
Schulz and Tanguay (2006) examined the faculty perceptions regarding merit
compensation at a large, public eastern research university. They distributed web-based
and hard copy surveys to all 2,617 full-time faculty members included in the 2001-2002
collective bargaining agreement with the university. The research team collected a
sample of 486 respondents, an 18.6% response rate. The respondent sample was 70%
male and 87% Caucasian. While the authors did not find a statistical difference between
the gender and racial diversification of sample as compared to the population, they
acknowledge that the low number responses from the campus’s African American and
Hispanic faculty members as a limitation of the study by “restricting statistical power
when analyzing race-based differences” (Schulz & Tanguay, 2006, p. 75). An additional
limitation of the study stems from the underrepresentation of assistant professors in the
sample; only 19% came from the assistant professor ranks. The plurality of responses
came from professors, at 45% of the sample, with an additional 32% of responses from
associate professors and 4% from full-time lecturers.
The study analyzed the responses across four areas: the receipt of merit pay, merit
step increases, support of merit pay, and performance improvement. Schulz and Tanguay
(2006) found 71% of respondents received merit pay rewards in the 2000-2001 academic
year. The 341 recipients of merit compensation received an average $1,800 in awards
with the self-reported range for the sample being between $300 and $6,000. While merit
evaluation systems typically focus on research, teaching, and service, Schulz and
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Tanguay (2006) found that all three factors positively related to the receipt of merit pay,
but research activities were the only statistically significant variable. The study found
that faculty with between six and 24 years of service at the university were the most
likely to benefit from the merit plan in comparison to either the faculty group with 25 or
more years or the group with 5 or fewer years of service. The logistic regression analysis
found significant negative relationships for both faculty with 5 or less years of service
and for faculty with 25 or more years.
In addition to asking respondents about dollar amounts, the survey also inquired
as to the number of merit step increases. With the number of merit steps as the dependent
variable, Schulz and Tanguay (2006) found both research and teaching as significantly
positive indicators. However, in contrast to the previous test with merit dollars as the
dependent variable, those with the fewest years experience at the university were more
likely to receive greater merit step increases than those with six to 24 years service.
Faculty members with 25 or more years at the institution had a significant negative
relationship with the number of merit step increases. Likewise, the model also revealed
that associate professors had “significantly higher merit step increases relative to full
professors” (Schulz & Tanguay, 2006, p. 78).
When Schulz and Tanguay (2006) examined support for merit pay as the
dependent variable, they only found two significant independent variables. Professors in
the business school were significantly supportive of the merit plan in comparison to
faculty in the arts and sciences. Female faculty members significantly opposed the
university’s merit compensation system in comparison to their male counterparts.
Likewise, when the study examined performance improvement since the implementation
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of the merit system, female faculty members responded significantly and negatively to
improvement based on neutral or poor evaluations. As previously discussed, merit based
pay systems rely upon the intuitive logic that relates work to a desired reward. However,
the study conducted by Schulz and Tanguay (2006) revealed that female faculty members
are significantly and negatively opposed to pay-for-performance systems in comparison
to their male counterparts. This opposition would negate any of the psychological and
economic motivational theories. Schulz and Tanguay (2006) speculate that female
faculty members perceive the process as unfair, which would thus preclude the necessary
preconditions established by Berman et al. (2010).
A multiple university study
Where previously discussed studies examined single universities or single
university systems, Terpstra and Honoree (2009) combined data from multiple
universities. From a list of 1,400 universities, the researchers randomly selected 600
schools of which 219 agreed to participate in the study. However, only 135 of the 219
utilized merit compensation. The research team then randomly selected 20 faculty
members from each university to e-mail an electronic survey. They received 490
completed surveys for an 18.1% response rate. While Terpstra and Honoree (2009)
attempt to contribute empirical data to the study of the impact of merit compensation
plans on faculty motivation, their methodology presents multiple limitations. Foremost,
the study appears to suffer from selection bias given the combination of the number of
institutions from the random sample that opted out of the survey and the limited number
of faculty survey at each institution. Moreover, given the wide degree of variance in
merit systems and their implementation, the study may have issues with internal and
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external validity. An addition limitation stems from the authors’ use of self-reported data
in linking an individual’s motivation with his/her compensation. Finally, the study does
not address whether or not merit systems actually result in an increase in faculty
productivity. While Terpstra & Honoree (2009) measure faculty perceptions, they do not
measure or the outputs or the outcomes produced by university professors.
Even with these limitations in mind, the study still provides a valuable depiction
of merit systems. First, merit plans only result in small to moderate increases in pay,
with 57% reporting increases between two and three percent while 28% of respondents
reported an increase of one percent or less. Likewise, 86% report small to moderate
distinctions between the merit increases given low and high performers. Department
chairs conducted 51% of merit evaluations with peer committees conducting 20% of
evaluations. Regardless of who conducts the evaluation, 78% of respondents reported
receiving some form of formal feedback. In 66% of institutions with merit evaluations
and compensation, the university does not make the information on pay increases
publicly available. Only 25% of universities conducting merit evaluations take past
appraisal periods into consideration. Sixty percent of respondents believed that the
general salary level at their institution fellow below the national average while only 13%
believed that their university paid above average salaries. A striking 80% of the sample
worked at a university without the presence of a union or collective bargaining
agreement.
Terpstra and Honoree (2009) analyzed how these factors influenced scholarly
research, teaching, and service. Respondents reported both significantly higher levels of
teaching motivation and higher quality of research when the merit plan made adjustments
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for past appraisal periods in comparison to plans not making such modifications.
Similarly, faculty members were significantly more likely to have higher levels of service
when the university did not make the merit plan public. Likewise, merit evaluations that
provide feedback to employees resulted in significantly higher levels of research
motivation, teaching motivation, and service motivation than plans that did not provide
feedback.
While Terpstra and Honoree (2009) conclude based on their analysis that merit
plans positively affect employee performance in four-year universities, it is important to
note that their respondents do not share that opinion. This perplexing distinction results
from the researchers asking both direct and indirect questions regarding merit. When
asked directly about their own institution’s merit plans, respondents felt that the systems
“had no effect on their individual motivation to engage in better teaching, more or better
research, or more or better service” (2009, p. 68). However, when the study asked for an
indirect measure of performance of faculty at the institution:
Respondents perceived that their merit plans had a somewhat positive effect on
the overall teaching effectiveness of their faculty, the overall quantity of research
of their faculty, the overall quality of research of their faculty, and the overall
level of service of their faculty. (Terpstra & Honoree, 2009, pp. 68-69)
Likewise, the results indicate that merit compensation plans have the greatest effect upon
the quantity of research. Moreover, the findings indicate that faculty believed merit plans
had no impact upon their individual levels of motivation.
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Conclusion
Stafford Beer described public agencies as “exceedingly complex probabilistic”
institutions (as cited in Tompkins, 2005), and that description certainly applies to public
universities. Managing the human resource needs of a public, four-year university can
pose enormous challenges. Not only do public universities employ a wide array of
classifications and job titles, but they also face the preponderance of employment issues
of any public agency while competing with private colleges and other areas of commerce
(Lowenstein, 2001). In times of shrinking budgets and fiscal pressure to scale back, the
collaborative efforts between human resources and academic resources shines as an
example of one possible solution to meeting these challenges (Connally & Neuman,
2006). This type of collaboration could allow merit pay systems to work as intended,
aligning the scholarship, teaching, and service of universities with the goals of the faculty
(Schulz & Tanguay, 2006; Terpstra & Honoree, 2009).
As previously discussed, universities are increasingly seeking modifications,
including merit compensation, to their existing faculty salary systems (Hanley &
Forkenbrock, 2006). However, moving in this direction poses both advantages and
disadvantages for universities and their employees. Foremost, these practices provide
faculty with the opportunity to compete for higher levels of compensation. Likewise, the
systems place universities in better positions to recruit and retain the best faculty
members. An additional advantage of merit systems and their evaluations is that they
provide university administrators with a metric to evaluate faculty. While this may act as
an advantage, James Wilson (1989) might argue that these evaluations attempt to run
public universities more like private enterprises, forcing a metric upon a coping agency
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whose operators, the faculty members, perform activities with outputs and outcomes that
are not always observable or measurable. This clearly emphasizes the critique that merit
systems overemphasize research, which is easy to measure, with too little emphasis on
teaching or service, which are both more difficult to define and measure. Working to
find an equitable means of measuring research, teaching, and service could pose one of
the key challenges for merit systems in public universities.
Once a system can identify an equitable means of evaluating research, teaching,
and service, then it must communicate this measurement to the faculty. Since the success
of merit depends upon both the system itself and the motivation of faculty, administrators
and faculty must communicate during the formation of the criteria. Furthermore, these
two groups must work together to find rewards beyond monetary compensation, such as
increased time for research while on sabbaticals, additional funding and additional
graduate assistants for research. Likewise, universities could attempt to appeal to
professors higher-level motivational needs, such as providing recognition in the form of
naming a room, lab, hallway, or wing after a high-achieving faculty members. If faculty
members at public universities do not enter their profession for the level of compensation,
then in order to create success, merit systems must couple monetary rewards with other
motivators as determined by the faculty at the institution.
While the content analysis of this research is not generalizable, it reveals distinct
areas for future research exploring merit compensation systems. First, analyzing data on
the effectiveness of pay-for-performance requires data from all affected groups. In
multiple instances, researchers lacked data on assistant professors. One could speculate
that this group feels the most pressure to publish, and also carries a higher course load
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than their tenured peers; therefore, they are less likely to take the time to complete a
survey. Likewise, the field needs additional exploration of how merit evaluations affect
those with the rank of professor. Furthermore, additional research should focus on
gender and merit. Female professors in the multiple studies were less trusting of merit
systems than their male counterparts. Thus, the issue requires additional research
exploring the validity of these concerns. Finally, researchers should take the variations
and nuances of merit systems into account when designing their analysis. Comparing
survey data from faculty at different universities, even different universities within the
same system, may not lead to valid conclusions if the institutions differ in size, scope, or
other characteristics.
While the current literature addresses the issues of effectiveness with merit
systems by measuring perceptions, future research should explore the relationship
between merit and productivity. Answering the question of whether or not merit systems
increase faculty productivity requires one to first define the outputs and outcomes by
which one will measure productivity. However, Wilson (1989) claims that education is a
coping industry, lacking measurable outputs and observable outcomes. Does teaching
improve when rewarded? Does either the amount or quality of research vary when
rewarded with merit? Proponents of merit compensation systems would certainly answer
these questions affirmatively, but once cannot validate those claims given the current lack
of empirical data.
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